Introduction almost any available metric, there is a wide gap the economic '-''"'"uu.., ... ifortunes of the Middle East and the West. 1 Even after accountwhich a small of Middle HC>C"t"' ... "'"' ... "' Westerners are on average about six times They can also to on average, eight years and have nearly twice the education (see Table 1 .1). One cause -and consequence of Middle Eastern economic retardation is poor governance and violence. The average H"u-.. .... "L..., Easterner lives in a much more and autocratic state and is subto much more civil ethnic violence the average Westerner. is the primary reason for the tensions between the Middle East and of the rest and it is at the root of the Islamists. Middle East -indeed, the West and "'"' 1 ''"'°'~,-,,,u recent
In the trial period, Western Europe was not obviously of the rest of the and it was not so far ahead of the East that the Ottoman HrY"''"'"'"' (the leading Middle Eastern state) felt economically or V'VU"~L~~u~ lnt".c>t'H'\"I" Over time, a vast and "'""'""'"'~'"·mT ""1'">'1'"""'y"'" between the two. This to dominate the rest of the world economically and politically, a fact most clearly maniin their colonization of a large portion of the world's inhabitable land. Meanwhile, by the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was considered the "sick man of Europe" -a once mighty on its final legs. The leadWestern European powers carved up the Middle East into states with artificial boundaries that suited geopolitical It is undeniable that the fortunes of the Middle East diverged from those of the West. But what caused this
The difference in fortunes is more puzzling than it might seem from a twenty-first-century For most of the last or two, Westerners had more contact with Middle Easterners than they did with the rest of the world.
between Western Europe and the Middle East "''"'"''·UJ'"'"'" more than it did between Western Europe and the world. The similarities between the two regions and their relative make the relative success of the West even more mysterious: What allowed Western economies to succeed where Middle Eastern ones stagnated? This is the question addressed in this book. At its core, this book is about why some economies succeed and others stagnate. It is tempting to ask whether Islam is to for the relative poverty and poor governance of the Middle East. It is to avoid question, even if it may be offensive to some; it is simply bad science to a hypothesis because it is offensive. And is reason not to dismiss this possibility offhand. The famed scholar of Islamic history Bernard Lewis seemed to suggest just this late in his career, 2 and there is a long Orientalist tradition ascribing bad Middle East over the last 1,200 years. 1.1 indicates that in 800, the urban share of the population of the Islamic world was much than in Christian Europe.
4 Fourteen of the twenty-two largest cities in Europe and the Middle East, including by far the largest city -the Abbasid capital Baghdad -were under Islamic rule. The Umayyad (Cordoba) Caliphate in modern-day Spain and the Abbasid Caliphate, centered in modernday Iraq, ruled the most populous and wealthiest areas. Seven of the eight most populous cities were Muslim-ruled, with only the Byzantine capital Constantinople containing a large urban population of Christians. In fact, the combined population of the top thirteen cities of Christian Western and Central Europe (Naples, Rome, Verona, Regensburg, Metz, Paris, Speyer, Mainz, Reims, Tours, Cologne, Trier, and Lyon) was less than the population of Baghdad in 800.
Fast forward 500 years. The scene described in the preceding paragraphs certainly changed by 1300, but even so the Middle East was far from a laggard, in spite of the decimation of some urban populations by the Mongols. Source: Bosker et al. (2013) .
and the Middle East, 1800 CE either Western or Central The Industrial Revolution had commenced in Great Britain, and the European powers had colonized much of the rest of the world. Real wages were much higher in northwestern Europe than they were in the wealthiest Muslim world. 6 The divergence was not solely between northwestern and the Middle East. By time, real wages between northwestern Europe and China, Japan, and India as well.7 Figure 1 .4 summarizes trend in economic fortunes. This presents the "urban center of gravity" of Western Eurasia each century from 800 to 1800. is a metric of the average '"""'"'11,,,r1 and latitude of the weighted by where urbanites lived. More populous areas "pulled" the center of gravity closer to themselves. The path in this figure is
In 800, the urban center of Western Eurasia was just west of the Anatolian Peninsula. It was pulled strongly to the southeast by the Abbasid Caliphate, which was centered in Iraq, while it was pulled south by the bustling urban areas of Egypt. The primary reason were not for the temporary shock of oil wealth, the Middle East would be one of the poorest places on earth, rivaled only by sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Southeast Asia. Historical curiosity should be enough to warrant an investigation into how this region -once the wealthiest and most cultured region in the worldfell so far behind.
But historical curiosity is not always enough. Historians and other intellectually minded individuals may appreciate the uncovering of historical connections as ends in themselves, but others consider historical research of this type worthwhile only if it sheds light on contemporary problems. This book should satisfy such a reader. It is first and foremost a book of economics. It uses economic theory to search for the general features of an economy that yield success under some conditions and stagnation under others. It uses Middle Eastern and Western European history as a testing ground for the theory. History provides one of the best grounds for economic hypotheses: what happened is behind us, and the long-run consequences are clear. This is certainly true of the long-run divergence between Western Europe and the Middle East. One set of economies was clearly much more successful than the other in the long run despite falling well behind early on.
This book addresses this issue with a general economic argument. When economists say that an insight is "general;' they tend to mean that it applies to many situations, and the insight may predict different outcomes Introduction depending on the parameters involved. 1his book aims to such a insight into how and why economic success and ., . . . "-!:'."·'-'"-U'-'"-over long periods. It should be obvious that this is not concern for the Middle East and Western the made in this book have implications for the difficult process of alleviating human suffering associated with economic underdevelopment around the world. After all, Western Europe was at one point an economic backwater, and the average wealth of medieval Europeans was lower than most of the parts of the world today. Understanding the mechanisms through which Western Europe escaped such poverty-and the Middle for the most did not -clearly has implications for possibilities and limits of economic growth in the developing world. can inform the Nor this book imply that the Middle East is helpless to its fortunes. In fact, one of the insights gathered from the book's framework is that there are many forks the path of a economic, political, and institutional progression. Once a society takes one along the fork, it becomes more difficult over time to revert to the other side.
new forks arise all the often for unanticipated or unforeseeable reasons such as new technologies or natural How societies '""'C'...,"·'"',, to these opportunities can have consequences. But nothpredetermines how a society will or when an will arise. History is not deterministic; we are not slaves to our historical and institutional past.
This book also does not suggest that the type of economic success that Western Europe experienced could have only happened The twentieth-century successes of South Korea and Taiwan are evidence against such a claim. Instead, this book urges a more nuanced view of why long-run economic success occurs, for features linked time and again to economic success.
Incentives
Economists like to think in terms of incentives. This book is no different. At every historical turn, it asks the question: Why did the relevant parties act in the manner they did? The answer given in this book always boils down to: "They were incentivized to act in that manner:' Incentives come from a host of societal attributes: politics, religion, social norms, laws, and culture are just a few. The inquiry cannot stop there: simply noting the incentives that individuals face is the last step. It is critical to take a step back and ask: Why were those incentives there in the first place? Why do the incentives people face in different places and at different times, and why do they change over time? Why do they sometimes not change over time?
Thinking in terms incentives means ideas of run economic out of the window. Take however, is a too simplistic argument. Older people are less likely to use advanced computing, not because they prefer the old ways more than do, but because the costs and benefits of learna new are different. It may in fact be less costly in terms for a seventy-year-old to become Internet proficient. Yet, a shorter life horizon for the elderly not only means that they will enjoy the fruits of learning to use Internet for a shorter period of time, but the opportunity costs associated with time taken to learn new technologies are much greater as well.
since their friends are much less likely to be on follow the because they face punishment -while legitimizing agents propagate through legitimacy -people follow the ruler because they believe he (or, much more rarely, she) has the to rule. Propagating agents can provide immense benefits to the ruler, but they also come at a cost: the ruler gives them a seat at the bargaining table in return for their support. The laws and policies resulting from this bargain are reflective of the bargaining power of each player and their preferences. Religious legitimation is especially attractive to rulers because it is inexpensive. Thus, rulers rely on religious authorities when those authorities have the capacity to legitimize their rule. In such a world, rulers are loathe to update laws in response to changing economic circumstances if doing so would undermine the religious establishment. As a result, those with the most to gain from modernizing a society's laws and policies -producers, merchants, and commercial farmers -have little incentive to push for change. Not only are rulers unlikely to side against the religious establishment, but such a request is also a sin. Consequently, laws and policies do not change in response to changes in the outside world, and the result is economic stagnation. This logic indicates that conservatism is a result of the incentives faced by the relevant players, not an ultimate cause of bad economic outcomes.
The upshot is that differences in laws and policies across societies and over. time within societies are a result of differences in the identities of propagatmg agents. These differences are themselves a result of differences in costs and benefits to rulers of using propagating agents. At one given point in time, a society's institutions impose these costs and benefits on rulers. Institutions are those aspects of society that help form the "rules of the game" by which all players abide. All societies have numerous types of instituti~ns -~~ligious, political, social, and economic -all of which help shape the game played between rulers and their propagating agents.
Chapter 3 brings the framework to the economic histories of Western Europe and the Middle East, exploring the historical reasons that rulep.ropagating institutions were different in the two regions. It argues that the circumstances surrounding the births ofislam and Christianity had important consequences for the manner in which rule was propagated. Islam was born ~n the ~eventh-century Arabian Peninsula, and it formed as the early Islamic empires were rapidly expanding. Many aspects of Islamic doctrine w~re .a response to this environment, including doctrine supporting a rulers nght to rul~ as long as he acted "Islamic:' Christianity, on the other hand, was born in the Roman Empire, with its previously established, wellfunctioning legal and political institutions. Early Christianity never formulated a corpus of legal or political theory that came close to rivaling that of early Islam for the simple reason that early Christian thinkers did not need to do so. This is not to say that religious legitimacy was unimportant in It matters who sat at the bargaining table two reasons: ( 1) doctrine exists in both Islam and Christianity that affects economic practices; (2) the interests of religious elites do not always align with the types of laws and policies that favor economic success. Chapter 4 brings to light ~ne con~e quence of this insight, overviewing the histo.ry of a~ ec~nomic doctnne common to Islam and Christianity: laws agamst takmg mterest on loans (usury). This chapter employs the framework to shed light on why usury doctrine diverged in the two religions. It highlights the different ways that political and religious authorities interacted in the t_w~ regions a~d how this in turn affected the willingness of rulers to permit mterest. This ter hardly claims that differences in interest laws were the reason Western ._,."""'"'""'"'-n economies surpassed the Middle East Yet, it does show that these restrictions were not completely innocuous. The of financial instruments employed in the two reflected doctrinal differences and, more importantly, the lack institutions in the Middle East to the nineteenth century.
5 analyzes the of the sheds on a historical in Western Europe after its invention by Johannes Ottomans prohibited its use for almost 250 years. The for the different reactions to the press is straightforward. The printing press threatened the Ottoman religious establishment's monopoly on the transmission of knowledge -a key source of their in societythey therefore had incentive to encourage the sultan to prohibit it. The sultan ohllI2:e:a because religious authorities were important legitimizing agents, and permitting the press would have undermined them. Meanwhile, Christian rel~ -gious leaders were in no position to ask to block the press, and it consequently spread rapidly throughout Europe.
. analyses of interest and printing restrictions suggest there is .L•'-'•-.LH.L.L"' inherent in Islam that fosters an environment supporting anti-commerce laws. In fact, early Islamic religious and doctrines were quite flexible and possibly even growth promoting. Reinterpretation of religious law was frequent as demanded by economic and social conditions, and as a result the Middle East was an economic, technological, and cultural leader for centuries after the founding of Islam. Many of the Islamic laws that eventually inhibited economic development were well suited to the needs of the early Islamic economy.
as economic conditions advanced, the legitimizing relationship between political and religious authorities had an increasingly dampening effect on further economic development. Religious doctrines such as those banning interest or reproducing words and images, which were not a problem in the premodern economy, came to the fore as an impediment to overcome.
The printing press was arguably the most important information technology of the last millennium, and Western European economies grew rapidly where it spread. But the indirect consequences of the spread of the press were even more important. Chapter 6 highlights one of these consequences: the press facilitated the of Protestant Reformation. printing press permitted widespread, rapid dissent, allowing the Reformation to succeed where previous anti-Church movements failed. This chapter reports the results of empirical analyses that show that the Reformation was much more likely to take hold in towns with access to printed works. This is a classic case of a "fork" in a society's long-run institutional trajectory. Such an anticlerical movement, which was so dependent on the rapid flow of information, was much less likely to happen in the Ottoman Empire, where access to printed works was minimal. The lack of information technology in the Ottoman Empire capable of quickly transmitting ideas allowed established interests to maintain their grip on power, permitting the status quo to hold for centuries. As a result, religious authorities remained powerful political forces in the Middle East for centuries after their influence waned in Western
The remainder of the book argues why the Reformation was such an important event for the economic trajectory of Western Europe -and why a lack of a similar undermining of religious authority was important for the trajectory of Catholic Europe and the Muslim Middle East. primary insight is that the Reformation fundamentally transformed the manner in which rule was propagated. The already weak legitimizing capacity of religion eroded further in Protestant states following the Reformation, forcing Protestant to change the agents that propagated their rule. The most common response was to seek propagation by the economic elites who served in parlfaments. By economic elite I simply mean those people primarily engaged in commerce: merchants, craftsmen, money changers, commercial farmers, and anyone engaged in either producing for market or facilitating market transactions. The transition to propagation by the economic elite was an important development, because their preferences tended to align more with those types of that also portend economic success, such as secure property and public good Consequently, Protestant rulers more frequently enacted laws and ._,'-''''-'"'.l.'v" favoring long-run economic success than did Catholic or Muslim rulers. This is not to say that the economic elite were more "public than other types of propagating agents and therefore desired policies in the public interest due to altruistic motives. Quite the opposite, it suggests that the economic elite pursued their own interests, which just so happened to coincide with policies that benefited the broader economy. Nor is it to say that everything the economic elite desired was good for the economy; history is with examples of rent seeking by the economic elite. is also not to say that a political system run solely by the economic elite be a good an economy. It does imply, that a ""'""''··"'""'~· tern where the economic elite have a nontrivial seat at the bargaining enables better economic outcomes than one have no voice at all. Chaot:ers 7 and 8 dig into the relevant histories to support these assertions. framework "'r'"''""'"" which its where the modern economy was a very economy equilibrium by end of the sixteenth ,..,..,....,,-t-,,. .. ., -one that was more conducive to economic growth.
This framework thus turns simplistic notions '"''-'JLJ.H'-""~''J.J.l", "Protestant ethic" to economic success on their head. 10 Max Weber [2002] ) argued that Calvinist doctrine encouraged ers to show that were one of the "elect" by and worldly success. The "spirit of capitalism" thus pervaded the tTcne~na 1 u countries and placed them on a different economic path. observation that inspired this hypothesis is valid: many of the Protestant nations had a head start on modern economic growth. But, while recognizing that there is a correlation between Protestantism and economic success, this book argues for a very different causal channel than one based on culture or religious tenets. It suggests that the changes in political economy brought on by the Reformation -specifically the replacement of the religious elite with the economic elite at the bargaining table -was the key feature connecting Protestantism to economic success. This of course does not mean that the modern economy had to emerge in Protestant northwestern Europe. It simply entails that if one living in 1600 had to choose which part of the world industrialization and the associated explosion of economic growth would commence 150 years hence, Protestant northwestern Europe would have been a good choice.
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Other Explanations
The explanation proposed in this book for the "rise of the West" is far from the only one out there. The rise of the West is one of the big issues that economic historians tackle, and consequently have been many words dedicated to furthering our understanding of its causes. Many existing hypotheses nicely complement the one proposed in book. Such explanations focus on other aspects of the rise of the West or relative stagnation elsewhere, providing explanations reinforce the mechanisms highlighted in this book. There are also explanations that are dearly contradictory to the ones proposed in this book. I also address these below and indicate why I believe my explanation succeeds where those fail.
Complementary Hypotheses
The explanations for the "rise of the West" most closely related to the one presented in this book are those proposed by Avner Greif, Douglass.North, and Timur Kuran. Greif and North both provide useful frameworks for understanding the economic implications of institutions. Greif shows in a series of articles and his book, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy, how decentralized institutions worked to facilitate trade in the medieval period in the absence of centralized political and legal institutions. Greif focuses primarily on economic institutions that emerged outside of the state and how these institutions facilitated economic exchange. The focus of the present book is on a different slice of economic life: the Introduction ; ~ r•att1rnrt>C faced by the key Middle Eastern and Western political The institutional changes analyzed by Greif were necessary precursors of the historical factors explored in this book. Greif's work therefore provides a necessary complement to my One set of institutional differences studied by Greif that deserve .._._,...,,_,H .... ·H attention are those related to family structure. The European family structure resulted from the policies of the medieval Church that ..... i..,...,~ ·~L certain practices in order to weaken kinship ties (adoption, polygamy, remarriage, consanguineous marriage). According to Jack Goody (1983), the Church imposed these policies in the that people would donate their property to the Church at their death rather than to their ldn.12 In contrast, kinship ties were much more in the Middle ~,_.,.,,,,..,...,.,.,"...,""11c marriage was commonplace.
( 1994a, 2006a, 2006b ) argues that, as a result, European culture was more "individualistic" than H'J.JU'-•.Lv Eastern culture, which was more v'-i'Jl. Lv---u institutions that created trust outside of the group, as the nuclear was too small of a unit to engender from 13 rhT<lr\1"'CIO'C•f1 the Middle East when the scope of trade was J..LLUU ... ,.,,, .... , within the kin group could occur without institutional aeve1opme~m:. Howe'ver. impersonal exchange on a wide scale once late medieval l-in1·An,pcin communities established institutions that facilitated the kin group. are entirely consistent with ones presented in this book. For one, the same for why Islam may have been beneficial to economic in the context: it connected Muslims through the of umma, which views the entire Islamic community as one. And Greif's for the ultimate success of the economy nicely my explanation. kin ties may have ultimately discouraged in the but this alone does not why the economic elite were never able to a seat at the bargaining table. The argument presented in this book fills in this gap, arguing that the economic elite never had a at the bar-,...,.,,,.., r, 0 table because Middle Eastern rulers were strong due to the legitimizing capacity of Islam, to exclude them.
Another set of works from which the nrt>CPlr'lT and insight are Douglass North's works on especially his books Structure and Change in Economic History and Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. A focus of North's works is connecting political institutions to the expansion of rights. The emergence of such institutions in northwestern Europe were undoubtedly important, and they play a key role in the theory laid out in this book.
North extended his contributions to this literature in seminal article with Barry Weingast (1989), which suggests that the imposition of institutionalized constraints on executive authority in England following the Glorious Revolution of 1688 was the key turning point, since it gave an increased political voice to wealth-holders. North, John Wallis, and Weingast extend this argument even further in their book Violence and Social Orders, claiming that opening access to impersonal and impartial legal and economic institutions is the key to economic growth. In their view, open access is important because it encourages a wider swath of the population to use resources efficiently. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (2012) make a similar argument in their book Why Nations Fail, that governments that permit extraction are the primary historical to economic growth. These are all consistent with the one in this book. By and this book takes the year 1600 as its stopping point. One implication of my argument is that by 1600, there were certain parts of Western Europe were primed for an economic takeoff in the spirit of what North and describe. Hence, this book merely pushes their arguments back a few centuries, noting why such events were more likely to happen in say, the Ottoman Empire. The employed in this book is similar to the important works of Timur Kuran. Kuran, in a series of papers and his book, The argues that there were numerous of Islamic law stimulate commerce in the premodern economic environment stifled economic progress as the environment He employs a similar tactic to the one used in this book, searching for an explanation can both early Middle Eastern economies succeeded and Western Europe eventually pulled ahead. Kuran primarily focuses on demand -or thereof -for legal change in Middle Eastern history, focuses on its supply. 14 Our works are thus neicessar·y ciompie:mt:~ms to each other; it is impossible to fully understand a complete comprehension of the supply side, and and North's works, Kuran and I ask the same big parts of them. Jan Luiten van Zanden employs the insights of Greif, Kuran, North, and many others in his book, The Long Road to the Industrial Revolution. van Zanden argues that one specific phenomenon -the "European Marriage Pattern"
to the institutional formation that took place in early and helped set it off from the rest of the world. Specifically, van suggests that the propensity of northwestern European men and women to get married later in life encouraged them to focuses on the fact that was into small states that were frequently at war, whereas much of the rest of the world was dominated large that less political competition. The main idea in this literature, formulated by Paul M. Kennedy (1987) 19 Yet, one of the key insights in the present book is that the Middle East ultimately suffered precisely because their rulers were strong: the strength of their rule, due in part to religious legitimation, permitted them to grow empires without having to negotiate with the economic elite. The opposite was the case in Europe, where rulers were relatively weak due in part to low levels of religious legitimation. This argument complements the fractionalization literature because it provides an explanation for Europe's fractionalization. 20 Indeed, it goes beyond this literature by providing an account for intra-European differences in long-run economic outcomes. The modern economy was born in northwestern Europe, not just Europe. This fact is difficult to account for in an argument based solely on European fractionalization.
A different set of hypotheses focus on the economic effects of rhetoric, intellectualism, and the Enlightenment. A compelling example from this literature is Deirdre McCloskey's Bourgeois Dignity, which suggests that the way people talked mattered. In particular, a shift in language, particularly in England and the Netherlands, more favorable to commerce and trade was instrumental in changing mindsets and encouraging talented and wealthy individuals to pursue commercial activities previously considered base. Joel Mokyr (2002 Mokyr ( , 2009 ) presents a complementary argument, suggesting that new ways of thinking and acquiring knowledge, particularly in association with the seventeenth-eighteenth century the economic behavior of producers and entrepreneurs in favor ing toward more efficient techniques. Both McCloskey and Mokyr dearly point out important aspects of the growth of the modern economy; it is difficult to imagine a modern economy in which an inquisitive and experimental impulse was lacking in business or those engaging in commerce were pariahs.
it is unclear what the prime mover is in these arguments. Could it possibly be true that a change in attitudes toward merchants occurred without a concurrent rise in the power or wealth of these classes? Is it not possible that the Enlightenment and other intellectual movements were responses to economic or political conditions? The arguments made in the present book help shed light on these problems by providing insight into the conditions that made such movements possible in the first place.
Contradictory Hypotheses
The most important set of contradictory hypotheses to the one proposed in this book centers around differences in culture. I already stated the primary problems with explanations based on culture -they often confuse Introduction correlation with causation, suggesting that a "conservative" culture is the cause of the problem when it is actually a result of forces also affecting economic and political differences. Of course, culture matters to economic outcomes.
hypotheses of this ilk tend to treat culture as unchanging. An important example of such an argument yet comes from Max Weber (1922), who famously ascribed the relative economic retardation of the Middle East to the "conservative nature" of Islam. Such a claim was seconded in more recent expansive histories by David Landes (1998 , ch. 24), Eric Jones (1981 , and even Joel Mokyr (1990, pp. 205-6) , who in a fantastic book on technology and economic development suggests that a shift to a more conservative outlook contributed to the long-run technological backwardness of the Middle East. 21 The book an alternative conservatism is not an iiii~~i ·~ii~ feature of a society, but an outcome based on a lack of incentive to ...,uv•. Another explanation, more prevalent in the popular press than in acais that Western colonialism is the cause of Middle Eastern economic stagnation and political violence. In view, the nineteenth-and twentieth-century plundering of North and the Middle East European powers inhibited the region's economic development. The most popular variant of this argument is that the carving up of the Middle East under the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 without regard to tribal, ethor religious identities set the stage for internal conflicts from which the region has yet to escape. 25 This is an attractive idea to those who want Introduction 23 than one thousand years because it was not a of early Islamic doctrine? Both the religion of Islam and the structure of Middle Eastern states changed on numerous fronts in the last 1,400 years, especially in the first four Islamic centuries. There is nothing inherent to Islam that would forbid change in the manner that Lewis implies. The present book provides an answer where Lewis is lacking one. Instead of simply assuming that differences in how rulers used Christianity and Islam were "built into" the system, it provides an explanation for why the legitimizing relationship between rulers and religious authorities diverged over time. Unlike Lewis, my explanation does not rely on a Eurocentric assumption of the "Orient" merely being stuck in its ways.
I argue that where we do not see change it is not because of some inherent conservatism or alter-"unthinkable;' but because it was in the interests of to maintain the status quo. wealth is a economists and economic historians. Political scientists are interested in the role that rulers and political institutions played in process that the modern economy. I also to but false claims about the connections between outcomes. To the extent that r\A"'"'' 1 "''"' I avoid using eco-"'""1.'"i-1"""' with words.
Whenever an economist writes for a it is difficult to avoid writing in a manner that prevents misinterpretation. This is even truer when writing on religion, a topic in which many people have preconceived notions on what they want the answer to be. I attempt to preempt any such misinterpretation throughout the book, wherever it is appropriate, and I re-address the major misconceptions of the argument in the concluding chapter. But there is one misconception worthy of addressing at the end of this introductory chapter. This is, namely, that this book is very much not a diatribe against religion. Nor is it a diatribe against Islam. It is true that this book seeks an explanation for why the Middle East fell behind Western Europe, and that it finds "getting religion out of politics" to have played a major role in this process. But there is almost nothing about Islam or Christianity per se that is at the root of these differences, save their capacity to legitimize rule. Nor is there anything specific to religion that is "bad" for economic outcomes: propagation by any entity with interests not aligned with broader economic success will likely lead to laws and policies detrimental to long-run economic fortunes. More importantly, while this book tackles a controversial topic, it does so with no underlying agenda besides being a quality work of economics. It is not pro-or anti-Islam or pro-or anti-religion. It is simply an argument that uses economic logic to improve our understanding of the origins of the modern economy and why it and did not emerge -when and where it did. 
